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INTRODUCTION
Despite differences in patent law jurisprudence in Germany, the
United Kingdom and the United States, the fundamental principles un-
derlying each system serve the same basic purpose: to encourage
technological innovation and dissemination of knowledge.' In granting
exclusive patent rights, it is important that the scope of patent protection
not be so broad as to remove existing knowledge from the public do-
main.2 The scope of protection should strike a balance between granting
adequate patent rights while preserving the public's ownership in the
public domain or the prior art. To encourage innovation patentees must
attain significant exclusive rights, while potential infringers receive suf-
ficient notice of a patent's scope.3 To realize patent system goals, the
scale measuring adequate patent protection should not be so heavy as to
outweigh the public's right to know the scope of a patentee's rights.4
Several issues in patent law jurisprudence in the aforementioned
countries reveal the tension between adequate protection and the
rights of the public. Such doctrines include: a) the on-sale bar,'
1. The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology,
to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 7,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agree-
ment], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTs OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33
I.L.M. 81, 86-87 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (stating that the Patent Clause of the United States
Constitution U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8. "reflects a balance between the need to encourage
innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant
advance in the 'Progress of Science and useful Arts' ").
2. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146.
3. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997)
("There can be no denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts
with the definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement.").
4. See id.
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2001) (Providing a one year grace period for the filing of
patents once the invention went "on sale"). Convention on the Grant of European Patents
(European Patent Convention), October 5, 1973 art. 54, 13 I.L.M. 270, 286 available at
http://www3.european-patent-office.org/dwldlepclepc_2000.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2001)
[hereinafter EPC] (requiring all patentable inventions to be new or not in use); see also Pfaff v.
Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 65 (1998). ("The patent system represents a carefully crafted
b) public use,6 c) obviousness,7 and d) the doctrine of equivalents.8 While
all four issues are illustrative, this Article focuses on the doctrine of
equivalents.
Infringement occurs under the doctrine of equivalents when an ac-
cused device does not fall literally within the scope of the claim
language, yet is an equivalent of what is claimed.9 The doctrine of
equivalents prevents those who make insubstantial changes to a patented
invention from reaping the benefits of such an insignificant contribu-
tion.' As such, the doctrine elevates substance over form in
circumscribing infringement. In three major industrialized nations-
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States-there has been a
genuine convergence of doctrine of equivalents jurisprudence." In both
Germany and the United Kingdom, the doctrine of equivalents has vital-
ity.2 The scope of the doctrine of equivalents does not encompass
bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful ad-
vances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time. The
balance between the interest in motivating innovation and enlightenment by rewarding inven-
tion with patent protection on the one hand, and the interest in avoiding monopolies that
unnecessarily stifle competition on the other, has been a feature of the federal patent laws
since their inception").
6. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2001) (Providing a one year grace period for the filing of
patents once the invention was in "public use"); EPC, supra note 5, art. 54, 13 I.L.M. at 286
(requiring all patentable inventions to not have previously been made available to the public);
Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)l, 23-24 (1829) ("If the public were already in posses-
sion and common use of an invention fairly and without fraud, there might be sound reason for
presuming, that the legislature did not intend to grant an exclusive right to any one to monopo-
lize that which was already common. There would be no quid pro-no price for the exclusive
right or monopoly conferred upon the inventor for" the patent term.).
7. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1965). EPC, supra note 5, art. 54, 13 I.L.M.
at 286 (requiring that all patentable inventions contain an "inventive step").
8. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29 (" '[A] distinction can be drawn that is not too eso-
teric between substitution of an equivalent for a component in an invention and enlarging the
metes and bounds of the invention beyond what is claimed."' quoting J. Nies dissenting in
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512, 1573-74 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (emphasis in original)). See also supra note 3.
9. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950).
10. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 24-25; Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608-09.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See Entsheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] [Supreme Court]
98, 12 (19) (F.R.G.) translated in Formstein, 1991 R.P.D.T.M.C. 597, 604 (1991). Formstein
was the first case after the new German Patent Act of 1981, which was introduced to harmo-
nize the national laws to the European Patent Convention. In this case, the Supreme Court of
Germany quoted from the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 to formally hold that the
doctrine of equivalents had vitality under the new law:
Under the Protocol on the Interpretation of
Article 69 [of the European Patent Convention], the extent of protection afforded by
a patent does not merely include what follows from the precise wording of the
claims. The way is therefore open to determine the extent of protection in a manner
that goes beyond the wording of the claims so as to include modifications of the
Festo2001-20021
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equivalents that belong to the state of the art or that which is obvious
over the state art. 13 United States jurisprudence has not maintained the
same structure as Germany and the United Kingdom, but the underlying
principles have been in accord until recently.
4
In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.," the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit)
unraveled centuries of precedent. The court virtually eliminated the doc-
trine of equivalents as a method of finding patent infringement in routine
and conventional situations. Prior to Festo, the doctrine of equivalents
was a viable theory for determining patent infringement. After Festo, the
policies underlying the doctrine of equivalents have taken a back seat to
bright line rules with little substantive basis.
The Festo court held that any narrowing amendment made to a claim
element during prosecution, for "a reason related to patentability" trig-
gers prosecution history estoppel such that no range of equivalents is
available for that amended claim element.6 According to the court, what
was said or even whether the applicant was silent as to why the narrow-
ing amendment was made during prosecution is irrelevant. 1 No range of
equivalents is given to the amended claim element absolutely." Pro-
claiming the doctrine of equivalents unworkable in its current state, the
court instituted this drastic change. 9 This produced the even more trou-
bling result that amendments made for procedural reasons, rather than
for distinguishing prior art, preclude any range of equivalents as to the
amended claim element. "[B]ecause most patents contain claims that
were amended during prosecution, ... [Festo] effectively strips most
invention described in the claims. It is within the knowledge of the court that the
extension of protection beyond the wording of the claims to equivalent forms of
embodiment corresponds to the legal concept which the states participating in the
European Patent Convention had in mind, even though significant differences of
detail still exist, both as to the method of determining the factual extent of
protection and as to the scope of the protection granted.
BGHZ 98, 12 (19) (F.R.G.) translated in Formstein, 1991 R.P.D.T.M.C. 597, 604 (1991). The
"extent of protection" mentioned above is essentially the scope of patent protection including
literal meaning of the claims as well as the expanded scope available under the doctrine of
equivalents. The European Patent Convention does not specifically define the doctrine of
equivalents so that harmonization of the patent law does not remove the ability of individual
countries to formulate their own jurisprudence to define the doctrine.
13. See infra Parts V.A-C.
14. See infra Part V.D.
15. 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S.Ct. 2519 (2001).
16. Id. at 574.
17. Id. at 578.




patentees of their rights to assert infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents .... 2o
Prior to Festo, the Federal Circuit used a "flexible bar" approach to
determine equivalents. There was no entrenched formula for establishing
the range of equivalents available to a claim element.2' Equivalency deci-
sions were made on a case-by-case basis, with many variables evaluated
in reaching a decision. = The Festo Court rejected the "flexible bar" ap-
proach and embraced the "complete bar" approach, eliminating any
range of equivalents when a narrowing amendment is made to a claim
element. The "complete bar" approach, however, is detrimental to patent
owners because it subjugates substance in favor of form.
In Festo, the Federal Circuit created a bright line rule to solve a
problem it considers "unworkable.' Bright line rules do, in most in-
stances, provide clear guidance. Moreover, society needs bright line
rules in numerous important situations. In criminal cases, for example,
where basic human rights are at stake, bright line rules serve both as a
bulwark of individual liberty and as a means of ensuring that, otherwise
well founded, convictions are not overturned. Bright line rules defining
when police officers must obtain a search warrant or "read" people their
rights meet this goal.2 The Festo "complete bar" rule, however, serves no
such fundamental purpose.
Rather than permit form to triumph over substance, perhaps it is bet-
ter to substantively examine the major public policy issues surrounding
the application of the doctrine of equivalents. These issues can be
20. Festo, 234 F.3d at 598 (Michel, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also
Black & Decker, Inc. v. Hoover Serv. Ctr., 886 F.2d 1285, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Considering
that virtually every patent application is amended, acceptance of the ["complete bar" ap-
proach] would read the doctrine of equivalents out of the law').
21. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
22. Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (equiva-
lency is determined on a case-by-case basis, looking at many variables, such as "the form of
the claim, the nature of the invention defined by it, the kind of limitation that is not literally
met, etc'); We Care, Inc. v. Ultra-Mark Int'l Corp., 930 F.2d 1567, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("[A] determination of infringement based on [the doctrine of equivalents] cannot be made in
a vacuum; the prior art must be examined...."); Black & Decker, 886 F.2d at 1295 ("[T]he
range of equivalents to which a claimed invention is entitled may never be so great as to en-
compass a structure in the prior art.... [Tihe mere fact of amendment... may result in a
limiting effect on the range of equivalents 'within a spectrum ranging from great to small to
zero." (citations omitted)); Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 986
(Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Equivalency is determined in the light of prior art, the patent specification,
and the prosecution history... ").
23. See Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 2046 (2001) (stating that with respect
to search and seizure, the Fourth Amendment draws procedural firm bright-lines at the en-
trance to the house, requiring clear specifications about methods of surveillance requiring a
warrant); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966) (detailing the procedural safe-
guards defining when the prosecution may or may not use statements from defendants
stemming from a custodial interrogation).
Festo
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addressed in the context of a doctrine of equivalents analysis, without
virtually eliminating the doctrine altogether, in order to embrace formal
strictures.
United States courts, as well as those of other countries, have articu-
lated that the proper scope of a patent claim should extend beyond the
literal language of that claim and reach equivalents. In expanding this
scope, however, courts have discussed why it is important to restrain the
scope of equivalents so that it does not encapsulate what is already in the
public domain. First, when applied too broadly, the doctrine of equiva-
lents conflicts with the statutory, definitional and notice functions of
claiming.24 Second, it is vital that patentees are prevented from obtaining
a scope of equivalents encompassing the prior art.5
The doctrine of equivalent8 has retained its vitality in other jurisdic-
tions, namely Germany and the United Kingdom. There is no reason to
draw a bright line rule that would overwhelm the doctrine of equivalents
to effectual extinction. The proper sphere for prosecution history estop-
pel is as a complement to the doctrine of equivalents. When a bright line
rule uses prosecution history estoppel to essentially eliminate the practi-
cable use of the doctrine of equivalents, the doctrine is expunged. This
conflicts with United States precedent and is inconsistent with the juris-
prudence of other jurisdictions that previously converged with United
States law.
Prosecution history estoppel, to complement and not subsume the
doctrine of equivalents, should be used only as an "estoppel" doctrine.
"Estoppel prevents a litigant from denying an earlier admission upon
which another has already relied." When a patentee affirmatively, not
silently, surrenders patent scope, the patentee should be constrained to
that abandonment. This comports with the underlying principle protect-
ing the public's right to that which is in the public domain, as well as the
notice requirement.
To further ensure that the scope of equivalents does not incorporate
the prior art, a doctrine of equivalents analysis should formally include
the following factors:
If an allegedly infringing device or process forms part of the
prior art, there can be no infringement; and
If an allegedly infringing device or process would have been ob-
vious over the prior art, there can be no infringement; and
24. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
25. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1989).
26. Festo, 234 F.3d at 619 (Rader, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 570 (7th ed. 1999)).
[V'ol. 8:1
2001-2002]
The aforementioned tests may only encompass those elements of
the allegedly infringing device that are covered in the patent
claim or are an equivalent to an element of the patent claim.27
Analyzing these factors in conjunction with a doctrine of equivalents
formulation will create or encourage a substantive inquiry, making it un-
necessary to throw out the rule, the doctrine of equivalents, in favor of
the exception, prosecution history estoppel. Moreover, these three factors
maintain consistency with the underlying principles behind the doctrine
of equivalents in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Part I of this article is a general overview of the history of both the
doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history estoppel; Part II dis-
cusses Festo and what the case holds; Part III discusses where Festo
conflicts with Supreme Court precedent; Part IV articulates the addi-
tional factors that encompass public policy concerns regarding scope
restraint as the basis for evaluating equivalents; Part V presents and ana-
lyzes cases utilizing the Formstein test in their rationales; Part VI
explores tangential issues prompted by the Festo decision; and Part VII
sets forth the conclusions reached from the analysis.
PART I
A. History of Doctrine of Equivalents
To comprehend the extent to which Festo has changed the law, a re-
view of the history and significance of the doctrine of equivalents is
instructive. This is important because Festo is a virtual elimination of
this kind of patent infringement.
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o
promote the progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."' In implementing this power, Congress has
granted patentees rights and remedies for patent infringement to deter
and compensate for any trespass to their inventions. 29 Beyond providing
a list of infringing acts, the patent statutes do not further define how
27. See Streamfeeder, LLC v. Sure-Feed Sys., Inc., 175 F.3d 974, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("Hypothetical claim analysis ... cannot be used to redraft granted claims in litigation by
narrowing and broadening a claim at the same time:'); Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Regis-
ter Co., 229 .3d 1091, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("[Hypothetical claim] analysis is not divorced
from the claim language, but rather must be anchored in the limitation for which a range of
equivalents is sought?'); BGHZ 98, 12 (22-23) (F.R.G.) translated in Formstein, 1991
R.P.D.T.M.C. 597,606-07 (1991).
28. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8.
29. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271, 283, 284, 289 (1994).
Festo
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patent infringement is to be determined. Defining what constitutes pat-
ent infringement has been left to the courts. Courts have recognized two
types of infringement, literal and doctrine of equivalents.3
Literal infringement exists when, after the claims have been con-
strued, the "accused matter falls clearly within the claim," 2 meaning that
the accused device falls within the literal language of the claim. The doc-
trine of equivalents provides that a patentee's invention covers not only
the literal language of the claim, but also all other forms that embody his
or her invention.33
As early as 1853, the Supreme Court expressed that a patent covers
"not only the precise forms [the patentee] has described, but all other
forms which embody his [or her] invention .... ." Pronouncing a prefer-
ence for substance over form, the Court said:
Where form and substance are inseparable, it is enough to look
at the form only. Where they are separable; where the whole
substance of the invention may be copied in a different form, it
is the duty of courts and juries to look through the form for the
substance of the invention-for that which entitled the inventor
to his [or her] patent, and which the patent was designed to se-
cure; where that is found, there is an infringement ......
The Court further highlighted that a patent is an exclusive right that
"is not secured, if the public are at liberty to make substantial copies of
it, varying its form or proportions.
36
Almost a century later, in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v.
Linde Air Products. Co.,37 the Supreme Court reiterated that patent in-
fringement should not be limited to only literal infringement:
30. See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 855
(1998).
31. See Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 401 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
("[T]he determination of patent infringement is a two step process. First, the meaning of the
claims in issue must be determined by a study of all relevant patent documents. Secondly, the
claims must be read on the accused structures. In doing this, it is of little value that they read
literally on the structures. What is crucial is that the structures must do the same work, in
substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result to constitute in-
fringement").
32. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
33. See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 Howard) 330, 342 (1853) ("[T]o copy the prin-
ciple or mode of operation described, is an infringement, although such copy [is] ... unlike
the original in form or proportions.").
34. Id. at 342.
35. Id. at 343.
36. Id. at 343.
37. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
[Vol. 8: 1
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[T]o permit imitation of a patented invention which does not
copy every literal detail would be to convert the protection of the
patent grant into a hollow and useless thing. Such a limitation
would leave room for-indeed encourage-the unscrupulous
copyist to make unimportant and insubstantial changes and sub-
stitutions in the patent which, though adding nothing, would be
enough to take the copied matter outside the claim, and hence
outside the reach of the law. One who seeks to pirate an inven-
tion, like one who seeks to pirate a copyrighted book or play,
may be expected to introduce minor variations to conceal and
shelter the piracy. Outright and forthright duplication is a dull
and very rare type of infringement. To prohibit no other would
place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism and would be sub-
ordinating substance to form. It would deprive him of the benefit
of his invention and would foster concealment rather than dis-
closure of inventions, which is one of the primary purposes of
the patent system.
The fundamentally self-evident nature of the Court's words notwith-
standing, defining when non-literal piracy of a patented invention occurs
has proven difficult. The Court's standard required the development of
doctrines that were, by their very nature, meant to be applied on a case-
by-case basis.
The doctrine of equivalents is the principal doctrine that defines non-
literal infringement and prevents an accused infringer from escaping li-
ability for patent infringement through making only minor or
insubstantial changes, while retaining the invention's central and funda-
mental likeness or identity.3 9 A patentee may invoke the doctrine of
equivalents to proceed against an alleged infringer if his or her device
"'performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way
to obtain the same result.' "" The doctrine protects inventors not only
from "unscrupulous copyists"41, but also from "unanticipated equiva-
lents" found in technology after the patent has issued.42
38. Id. at 607 (emphasis added).
39. See Id. at 608-09.
40. Id. at 608 (quoting Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877)).
41. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
42. Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing Hughes Air-
craft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983); See also Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 619 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., dis-
senting) (expressing the importance of doctrine of equivalents infringement for protecting
amended claims with respect to after-arising technology).
Festo
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Patent claims define the scope or the "metes and bounds" of the pat-
ented invention.43 On the one hand, it is important to give the patentee a
range of equivalents to protect his or her invention. On the other hand,
expanding the scope of equivalents too far could thwart the requirement
that the patent claims give "fair notice" of a patent's scope."" The Su-
preme Court recently revisited this issue in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton-Davis Chemical Co.
45
In Warner-Jenkinson, the Court announced that the "doctrine of
equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts with the definitional and
public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement., 46 The
Court provided means to constrain the doctrine by adopting the "all ele-
ments rule."47 The Court stressed that,
Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to
defining the scope of the patented invention, and thus the doc-
trine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the
claim, not to the invention as a whole. It is important to ensure
that the application of the doctrine, even as to an individual ele-
ment, is not allowed such broad play as to effectively eliminate
that element in its entirety.
4
Since Warner-Jenkinson, courts compare the patent claims to the al-
legedly infringing device in order to determine patent infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents. If the device does not fall literally
within the claims, then courts reexamine the allegedly infringing device
to determine whether doctrine of equivalents infringement occurred. This
can happen if for every claim element, there is an equivalent element in
the infringing device.49 The idea is to balance the patentee's right to pro-
tect the entire scope of the claimed invention against the public notice
requirement that the claims define the metes and bounds of the patented
43. Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 E2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
44. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000),
cert. granted, 121 S.Ct. 2519 (2001).
45. 520 U.S. at 29.
46. 1&
47. Id. at 28-29. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir.
1987) ("It is ... well settled that each element of a claim is material and essential, and that in order
for a court to find infringement, the plaintiff must show the presence of every element or its substan-
tial equivalent in the accused device" (quoting Lemelson v. United States, 752 E2d 1538, 1551
(Fed. Cir. 1985))).
48. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 29 ("Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the
scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual
elements of the claim not to the invention as a whole").
[Vol1. 8: 1
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invention." For an element to be an equivalent, the differences between
the claim element and the equivalent must be, according to one skilled in
the art, insubstantial or interchangeable.5 For example, a difference may
be insubstantial or interchangeable if the accused elements perform sub-
stantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain
substantially the same result as the invention.52 The particular linguistic
framework for determining equivalents is not set in stone. "Different lin-
guistic frameworks may be more suitable to different cases, depending
on their particular facts '53 The Court deferred to the Federal Circuit to
prescribe other appropriate methods of determining equivalents
Another way to prevent the doctrine of equivalents from expanding
too far and, thus, thwarting the notice requirement is to use the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel.5 Prosecution history estoppel limits a pat-
entee from expanding patent scope when such coverage has been
relinquished during prosecution of the patent application before the Patent
and Trademark Office ("PTO").56
The Wamer-Jenkinson Court further narrowed the doctrine of equiva-
lents by creating a new presumption affecting prosecution history estoppel:
Where no explanation [of a patent amendment] is established ....
the court should presume that the patent applicant had a substan-
tial reason related to patentability for including the limiting
element added by amendment.57
The Court emphasized, however, that this presumption is rebuttable if
the reason for an amendment gives "proper deference to the role of claims
in defining an invention and providing public notice, and to the primacy of
the PTO in ensuring that the claims allowed cover only subject matter that
is properly patentable in a proffered patent application."5
Another recent change to the Court's precedent concerns applying
prosecution history estoppel to amendments made for reasons other than
50. Id. at 29.
51. See id. at 39-40.
52. See id. at40.
53. Id. at 40.
54. "We expect that the Federal Circuit will refine the formulation of the test for equivalence in
the orderly course of case-by-case determinations... "' Id
55. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushild Co., 234 E3d 558, 564 (Fed. Cir.
2000), cert. granted, 121 S.Ct. 2519 (2001).
56. Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136 (1942) (recourse may not be
had to recapture claims patentee surrendered by amendment).
57. Wamer-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33.
58. Id. at 33-34; See Festo, 234 E3d at 632 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(noting that the majority in Festo holds that the presumption can only be rebutted by evidence that is
already in the record and as such would thus be irrebuttable because the record is "necessarily si-
lent" as to why the change was made in order for the presumption to arise).
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distinguishing over the prior art. The Warner-Jenkinson Court addressed
changes made for "patentability" reasons rather than prior art reasons. In
Festo, the Federal Circuit interpreted "patentability" to include changes
made for reasons other than prior art, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101.'9
The Court left a question unanswered in Warner-Jenkinson, however:
what range of equivalents is available when an estoppel applies under the
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel? In Festo, the Federal Circuit an-
swered this question: no range of equivalents is available.
B. History of Prosecution History Estoppel
It is helpful to visit the precedents surrounding the doctrine of prose-
cution history estoppel in order to understand the impact of Festo on
patent law jurisprudence.
As an estoppel doctrine, prosecution history estoppel prevents a liti-
gant from denying an earlier admission when another has relied upon it."
In the context of patent prosecution, "the admission is the applicant's sur-
render of claim scope to acquire a patent "'.. "Prosecution history estoppel
applies both 'to claim amendments to overcome rejections ... and to ar-
guments submitted to obtain the patent."' 62 Thus, the scope of the
surrender, normally, must be determined before the estoppel applies. Be-
fore Festo, in order to determine equivalents scope, courts looked to actual
amendments and attorney arguments to evaluate what subject matter was
surrendered. This can be characterized as a bargain (or contract) struck
between the patent attorney and the examiner in order to acquire the pat-
ent.63 "A patentee is not free to retrade or renege on a deal struck with the
PTO during patent prosecution."'64
59. Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and requirements of this title. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
60. See supra note 25.
61. Festo, 234 E3d at 619-20.
62. Townsend Eng'g Co. v. HiTec Co., 829 E2d 1086, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting Hughes
Aircraft v. United States, 717 E2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
63. Most foreign countries do not have a prosecution history estoppel doctrine. Germany
only has inter partes prosecution history estoppel in the context of an opposition or a nullity
proceeding where the patent owner clearly establishes that he or she did not mean to cover a
specific embodiment in the claim. This inter partes estoppel only has an effect between the
parties of the opposition proceeding or the invalidity action. This estoppel is seen more as a
kind of contractual limitation than an estoppel doctrine. In other words, patent applicant
agreed with the other parties as to the claim scope and is bound by such agreement. See
Weichvorrichtung, 95 Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und UrheberrechtRechtsprechung [GRUR]
886, 888 (1993) (F.R.G.).
64. Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., 126 E3d 1420, 1432-33 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Cf. Wil-
liam M. Atkinson ETAL., Was Festo Really Necessary, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
111, 134-35 (February 2001) ("Examining the prosecution history to determine permissible
equivalents is much closer to divining the intent of the parties in a contract dispute").
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The Supreme Court historically treated prosecution history estoppel
as an estoppel doctrine. The Court inquired into what the patentee sur-
rendered in order to attain a patent on the invention. As early as 1886,
the Court in Shepard v. Carrigan65 opined that where a patentee gives up
claim scope in order to get a patent issued, "he cannot after the issue of
the patent broaden his claim by dropping the element which he was
compelled to include in order to secure his patent."66 The same year, the
Court held in Sutter v. Robinson67 that during the prosecution process,
where the patentee limited his claims, "[h]e is not at liberty now to insist
upon a construction ... he was expressly required to abandon and dis-
avow as a condition of the [patent] grant." s
In 1900, the Court in Hubbell v. United States69 examined the pat-
entee's file wrapper history. The Court discovered that in order to obtain
a patent, patentee was compelled to accept a narrower claim construction
than that written in the original application. The Court held that:
[I]t is well settled that the claim as allowed must be read and in-
terpreted with reference to the rejected claim and to the prior
state of the art, and cannot be so construed as to cover either
what was rejected by the Patent Office or disclosed by prior de-
vices.70
In 1921, the Court in Weber Electronic Co. v. E.H. Freeman Elec-
tronic Co.7' held that patentee, having narrowed a claim to obtain a
patent, could not through claim construction or by application of the
doctrine of equivalents "give to the claim the larger scope which it might
have had without the amendments, which amount to a disclaimer.., as
an operative feature.... 72 That same year, in Smith v. Magic City Ken-
nel Club, Inc.,73 the Court held that when a patentee narrows a claim in
order to escape a patent rejection, he may not reclaim what has been dis-
claimed.74 In 1942, the Court stated in Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents
Corp.," "[i]t follows that what the patentee, by a strict construction of
65. 116 U.S. 593 (1886).
66. Id. at 597.
67. 119 U.S. 530 (1886).
68. Id. at 541.
69. 179 U.S. 77 (1900).
70. Id. at So.
71. 256 U.S. 668 (1921).
72. Id. at 677-78.
73. 282 U.S. 784 (1931).
74. Id. at 790.
75. 315 U.S. 126 (1942).
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the claim, has disclaimed... cannot now be regained by recourse to the
doctrine of equivalents... ?,76
The Federal Circuit followed the Supreme Court's view of prosecu-
tion history estoppel for many years. In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United
States,77 the court applied what is now coined the "flexible bar" ap-
proach.78 The flexible bar rejects the view that any claim amendment
creates an estoppel to bar all range of equivalents, restricting the patentee
to the literal language of the claims.79 Under the flexible bar approach,
the range of equivalents to a claim element is determined by what tran-
spired during the patent prosecution. An amendment "may result in
limiting the range of equivalents 'within a spectrum ranging from great
to small to zero.' ,,80
Because making amendments is a common practice in prosecuting
patent applications, there is no reason to stop applying the doctrine of
equivalents to those few claims allowed as originally fied, but never
amended." Eliminating the range of equivalents when prosecution his-
tory estoppel is applied virtually reads the doctrine of equivalents out of
patent law.82
The Federal Circuit followed the flexible bar approach from 1983
through most of 2000.83 But on November 29, 2000, the Federal Circuit
decided Festo, eliminating all range of equivalents when prosecution
history estoppel is triggered. 4 The Court held that an amendment made
to a claim element during prosecution, for reasons related to patentabil-
ity, gives rise to a complete bar against a claim of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. 5 This complete bar applies whether or not the
amendment was made voluntarily.86 Festo has significantly subordinated
the importance of the doctrine of equivalents in favor of prosecution his-
tory estoppel.
Because any amendment, regardless of whether there was surrender
of subject matter, bars all range of equivalents as to the element
amended, this approach is not an application of an estoppel at all. In a
76. Id. at 137.
77. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
78. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 .3d 558, 574 (Fed. Cir.
2000), cert. granted, 121 S.Ct. 2519 (2001).
79. See Hughes, 717 F2d at 1362-63.
80. Black & Decker, Inc. v. Hoover Serv. Ctr., 886 F2d 1285, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(quoting Hughes, 717 F2d at 1363).
81. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1363.
82. Black & Decker, Inc., 886 F2d at 1295.
83. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 613-15 (listing the Federal Circuit cases where the "flexible
bar" approach was applied).
84. Id. at 574.
85. Id. at 567.
86. Id. at 568.
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separate opinion, Judge Michel wrote, concurring in part and dissenting
in part,
The majority's approach gives no consideration to whether a
reasonable competitor would rely on the nature of the rejections
and of the amendments and statements between the applicant
and the examiner as evidence of surrender of subject matter.'
Prosecution history estoppel has been treated as a way to limit the
range of equivalents, and not as a method to entirely eliminate the doc-
trine of equivalents as a form of infringement. In keeping with this
tradition, prosecution history estoppel should remain subservient to the
doctrine of equivalents. The "complete bar" rule in Festo throws the pro-
verbial baby out with the bath water, an unattractive result to say the
least. 9 Festo is nakedly out of context because the doctrine of equiva-
lents epitomizes the idea of substance over form.90 The doctrine of
equivalents has been historically used to find accused devices infringing,
despite their failure to literally or formally fall within the claims.
In Festo, the majority said it eliminated the range of equivalents
when an estoppel applies because in such cases determining an appropri-
ate range of equivalents is unworkable.9' The majority's assessment
rested on its belief that there is no rule regarding the range of equivalents
that "can be relied upon to produce consistent results and give rise to a
body of law that provides guidance to the marketplace on how to con-
duct its affairs."92 Instead of erecting a bright-line rule that ignores
substantive inquiries, however, the court should have labored harder to
establish a "workable" doctrine that preserves the general theme of the
doctrine of equivalents.
87. Id. at 600 (Michel, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
88. Cf. Haynes Int'l, Inc. v. Jessop Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (New-
man, J., concurring) ("The broadening of prosecution history estoppel is a corollary to the
narrowing of the doctrine of equivalents ").
89. See also Atkinson ET AL., Was Festo Really Necessary, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 111, (February 2001) ("In effect, the Festo decision may have transformed prose-
cution history estoppel into an exception that swallows the rule:').
90. See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 Howard) 330, 343 (1853) ("Where form and
substance are inseparable, it is enough to look at the form only. Where they are separable;
where the whole substance of the invention may be copied in a different form, it is the duty of
courts and juries to look through the form for the substance of the invention-for that which
entitled the inventor to his patent, and which the patent was designed to secure; where that is
found, there is an infringement; and it is not a defence, that it is embodied in a form not de-
scribed, and in terms claimed by the patentee').
91. Festo, 234 F3d at 575.
92. Id.
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What was it about the facts in Festo that brought about such a drastic
change in philosophy? In the following section, the facts of Festo are
presented.
PART I-
A. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.93
The Federal Circuit decided the first Festo94 decision prior to the
Warner-Jenkinson decision. In the first Festo case, the court found that
the defendant infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. The court,
however, did not apply the element-by-element doctrine of equivalents
analysis required under Warner-Jenkinson. After the Supreme Court de-
cided Warner-Jenkinson, the Court granted certiorari in the Festo case
and vacated and remanded the case for further consideration in light of
the Court's doctrine of equivalents analysis in Warner-Jenkinsoni
Festo owns two patents, the Stoll and the Carroll patents, covering
magnetically coupled rodless cylinders comprising a piston, a cylinder,
and a sleeve. In response to hydraulic pressure, the piston moves inside
the cylinder. The sleeve, which lies outside the cylinder, is magnetically
coupled to the piston. As such, they move in conjunction with each other.
This enables the sleeve to move objects on a conveying system, and that
movement of objects is the purpose for the invention.96
The pertinent claims of the Stoll patent comprise one independent
claim and two dependent claims. Independent Claim 1 covers "sealing
means" located at opposite ends of the piston. Dependent Claim 4 is
drawn to two sealing rings, and dependent Claim 8 requires that the
sleeve is comprised of magnetisable97 material."
During prosecution, the examiner rejected all of the claims, but not
for reasons based on prior art. This is significant because, as was dis-
cussed in Part I B, prosecution history estoppel has, historically, applied
only when the applicant has surrendered subject matter to avoid prior art.
This changed, however, in Warner-Jenkinson, when the Supreme Court
created a new presumption where an amendment is made but the record
93. 234 E3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S.Ct. 2519 (2001).
94. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 72 .3d 857 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
vacated by 520 U.S. 1111 (1997).
95. Id.
96. Festo, 234 F.3d at 579.
97. The patent uses the English spelling of the word "magnetisable" instead of the
American, "magnetizable" See Festo, 234 E3d at 583. To be consistent, this Article adopts the
English spelling.
98. See Festo, 234 E3d at 583.
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is silent as to the reason for the amendment." In this situation, the Court
is to presume the patent applicant "had a substantial reason related to
patentability for including the limiting element added by the amend-
ment:" After Warner-Jenkinson, the question remained: what does
"patentability" mean? Is it just prior art, under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and
103, or does it include amendments made pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 101
and 112, that are often made for procedural reasons?
In Festo, the examiner rejected all of the claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112.'' The examiner found it unclear from the claims whether the pat-
ent was drawn to a true motor or magnetic clutch.' Further procedural
issues also raised concerns. Some dependent claims were rejected for
being written in improper multiple dependent form." The applicant
amended Claim 1 and canceled Claims 4 and 8."0 As amended, Claim 1
incorporated the magnetisable sleeve and two sealing rings of the can-
celed claims.'
Further, applicant brought new prior art to the examiner's attention
when submitting this amendment. Patentee discovered this prior art
while prosecuting a corresponding German application. According to the
applicant, however, the claims as amended were distinguishable over the
newly submitted prior art' 6 Thereafter, the examiner allowed the
amended claims. 7
The Carroll patent's relevant prosecution history is related to its re-
examination proceeding.' 3 The new prior art discovered during the prior
German prosecution sparked the applicant to request reexamination of
the Carroll patent. 9 The German patent described "rodless cylinders
having several of the features of the device described in the Carroll pat-
ent ... .,,0 Applicant added an independent claim containing a new
99. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997).
100. Id.
101. The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly con-
nected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).





107. Festo, 234 F3d at 583.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 584.
110. Id.
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claim element, "a pair of resilient sealing rings""' The examiner allowed
the new claims as amended.1
2
Festo sued SMC for infringing both the Stoll and the Carroll patents.
The jury found the Stoll patent infringed under the doctrine of equiva-
lents. The court ruled on the Carroll patent and granted Festo's motion
for summary judgment based on Festo's contention that some of SMC's
devices infringed the Carroll patent under the doctrine of equivalents."'
SMC appealed because the devices found to infringe under the doctrine
of equivalents had only one resilient two-way sealing ring located on one
end of the pistons. SMC argued that because the patents disclosed and
claimed devices with a pair of sealing rings, SMC did not infringe. Fur-
ther, SMC's claimed its devices had sleeves with outer portions made of
aluminum alloy, a nonmagnetisable material. Because the Stoll patent
disclosed and claimed a sleeve made of a magnetisable material, SMC
contended it did not infringe."
The court's determination that SMC had not infringed under the doc-
trine of equivalents can be characterized as an application of the Warner-
Jenkinson analysis with the addition of the "complete bar" prosecution
history estoppel rule." 5 First, the court found that the claim elements at
issue were amended and narrowed for reasons related to patentability."6
The court made that finding even while noting that the examiner did not
reject the Stoll patent claims for prior art reasons, but for procedural rea-
sons under § 112. The court said the two elements found to infringe by
equivalents were the cylindrical sleeve made of a magnetisable material
and the first sealing rings,"7 and that both of these elements were added
during prosecution as narrowing amendments."' Second, the court ob-
served that Festo had not demonstrated that either amendment was made
for a reason unrelated to patentability. Based on their finding that Festo
had not shown the amendments were made for reasons other than pat-
entability, the majority ruled that the presumption of Warner-Jenkinson
barred the application of the doctrine of equivalents." 9 Third, the court
found that Festo's sealing ring amendment in the Carroll patent reexami-
nation was made to distinguish over the prior art.
S1I1. Festo, 234 F.3d at 584.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 578-79.
114. Id. at 582.
115. Whether Warner-Jenkinson permits such an analysis will be discussed later in the
article. See discussion infra Part III.
116. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 588.
117. Id.at 587.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 588.
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In a separate opinion, Judge Newman disagreed with the majority's
characterization of the prosecution history. She opined that the changes
made to the Carroll patent during prosecution were not in response to
examination
For the Carroll patent, Festo added an element to the claims be-
fore reexamination. For the Stoll patent, Festo rewrote improper
multiple dependent claims, dropping the broader claim. In nei-
ther the Carroll nor the Stoll patent were the elements at issue
amended; however, in both patents estoppel is now held to be
complete barring any assertion of equivalency as to these ele-
ments .... '20
After the reexamination request was granted but before reexami-
nation on the merits, Festo cancelled original claim 1 and added
a new claim which differed from the original claim in several
ways including the addition of "a pair of resilient sealing rings."
Festo did not explain these changes; nor was explanation re-
quired, for the changes were made before action by the
examiner. 
12
Consequently, Judge Newman found there was no estoppel argument
against the Carroll patent because there was no bargain with the exam-
iner. Carroll did not surrender a portion of the pertinent claim element's
scope in order to obtain the patent."
Further, Judge Newman criticized the majority for not reaching the
critical question of equivalents but, instead, focusing on what may or
may not have been said during prosecution.'" The jury, the district court
and the Federal Circuit already found doctrine of equivalents infringe-
ment, pre-Warner-Jenkinson24 It seems only fair that the court would
look at the doctrine of equivalents analysis again under the post-Warner-
Jenkinson standards. The court, however, declined to reach this decision
120. Id. at 636 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
121. Id.
122. Cf. Festo 234 E3d at 632 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("The
majority holds that the [Warner-Jenkinson] presumption can only be rebutted by evidence that
is already present in the prosecution record.... Thus the majority holds that the rebuttable
presumption concerning the reason for an amendment, which presumption arises when the
prosecution record is silent as to the reason for the amendment, can not be rebutted with evi-
dence outside of the prosecution record. The rebuttable presumption thereby becomes
irrebuttable, because the prosecution record is necessarily silent in order for the presumption
to arise at all.").
123. Id. at 638.
124. Id. at 636; Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 72 F.3d 857
(Fed. Cir. 1995) vacated by 520 U.S. 1111 (1997).
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as the majority concluded that "the amended claim elements [were] enti-
tled to no range of equivalents.
'" 125
In the first Festo case, a case before a Federal Circuit panel, Judge
Newman, writing for the court, found substantial evidence supporting
the jury's verdict of doctrine of equivalents infringement.'26 Festo pre-
sented expert testimony that the SMC sleeve performed substantially the
same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the
same result as Festo's magnetisable sleeve.27 SMC argued that the omis-
sion of one of the sealing rings precluded a finding of infringement
under the "all elements rule." The court responded that the "all elements
rule" does not require one-to-one correspondence of components.
This determination, however, was made prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Warner-Jenkinson, which adopted the "all elements rule" and
required that no individual element be eliminated in its entirety when
applying the doctrine of equivalents.2' Thus, SMC's lack of a second
ring, effectively eliminated the second sealing ring element in its en-
tirety. Festo probably could have been decided on that basis alone,
without resorting to the new "complete bar" rule.29
The courts have two alternatives available to them with regard to
prosecution history estoppel. The court can claim that the changes were
made for reasons related to patentability, and therefore there is no clear
estoppel. A more advantageous interpretation is to focus on two ques-
tions (1) Is the allegedly infringing device an equivalent, or (2) Is the
allegedly infringing device practicing to prior art or obvious in view of
the prior art? If neither question is answered in the affirmative, there
should be no finding of infringement. Why should courts automatically
bar these questions from the discussion?30 It is enough to apply prosecu-
tion history estoppel as a true estoppel doctrine and ensure the doctrine
of equivalents is further limited by protecting devices that encompass the
prior art to restrain the scope of equivalents.
125. Festo, 234 F.3d at 591.
126. Festo, 72 F3d at 862-63.
127. Id. at 862-63.
128. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29. See supra Part I.A.
129. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 574-78 (adopting the complete bar approach to the applica-
tion of the doctrine of equivalents).




A. How Festo Conflicts with Supreme Court Precedent
Insofar as Festo essentially eliminates doctrine of equivalents in-
fringement in cases where a patent has been amended, the case conflicts
with Supreme Court precedent. In Warner-Jenkinson, the Court emphati-
cally held, "Today we adhere to the doctrine of equivalents."'13' The Court
could hardly be clearer in disclaiming any attempt to eliminate the doc-
trine from patent law jurisprudence.
In Warner-Jenkinson, the petitioner challenged Court precedent,
contending that the reason for an amendment during patent prosecution
is irrelevant to a subsequent estoppel.132 The Supreme Court expressly
disagreed, finding that a more limited application of prosecution history
estoppel than what was required by earlier precedent was inappropriate.
[P]etitioner reaches too far in arguing that the reason for an
amendment during patent prosecution is irrelevant to any subse-
quent estoppel. In each of our cases cited by petitioner ...
prosecution history estoppel was tied to amendments made to
avoid prior the art, or otherwise to address a specific concern...
that arguably would have rendered the claimed subject matter
unpatentable.... It is telling that in each case this Court probed
the reasoning behind the Patent Office's insistence upon a
change in the claims. In each instance, a change was demanded
because the claim as otherwise written was viewed as not de-
scribing a patentable invention at all-typically because what it
described was encompassed within the prior art.... Our prior
cases have consistently applied prosecution history estoppel only
where claims have been amended for a limited set of reasons,
and we see no substantial cause for requiring a more rigid rule
invoking an estoppel regardless of the reasons for a change.
3
Hence, the Court treated prosecution history as an estoppel doctrine
in Warner-Jenkinson. What is said during prosecution must be reviewed
on a case-by-case basis in order to determine what has been surrendered.
Festo further departs from Warner-Jenkinson by requiring a patentee
trying to prove that an amendment was made for reasons other than pat-
entability, to "base his [or her] arguments solely upon the public record
of the patent's prosecution, i.e., the patent's prosecution history" 34 In
131. Mirner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40.
132. Id. at 30.
133. I1arner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 30-32.
134. Festo, 234 F.3d at 586.
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Judge Newman's separate opinion, she criticized the court's application
of the "rebuttable presumption" of prosecution history estoppel as ap-
plied in Festo because it necessarily becomes irrebuttable:
The majority holds that the presumption can only be rebutted by
evidence that is already present in the prosecution record....
Thus the majority holds that the rebuttable presumption concern-
ing the reason for an amendment, which presumption arises
when the prosecution record is silent as to the reason for an
amendment, can not be rebutted with evidence outside of the
prosecution record. The rebuttable presumption thereby becomes
irrebuttable, because the prosecution record is necessarily silent
in order for the presumption to arise at all.'
It is unlikely that the Warner-Jenkinson Court, in explicitly creating
a rebuttable presumption, really intended it to be irrebuttable.
The Court's decision in Warner-Jenkinson confirms that the Su-
preme Court is attempting to limit the seemingly unbounded breadth of
the doctrine of equivalents. The Court wants to ensure that patent claims
themselves serve both a "definitional and notice function" to the public
and are constrained in accordance with public policy.'36
Festo treats patent applications having identical content differently
depending on whether or not an amendment was made to the application.
In other words, the process by which the application was prosecuted,
rather than its substance or the language of the patent claims as actually
granted, determines the scope of equivalence. For example, suppose Ap-
plication A has narrow claims that have not been amended and
Application B has identical claims to Application A, but only after
broader claims have been amended and narrowed. Application A may
obtain a range of equivalents as to its claim elements, but Application B
may not. An application that starts with broader claims that are later nar-
rowed is barred from any range of equivalents as to the amended
element.3 1 In Warner-Jenkinson, the Court did not authorize treating
identical applications differently where no surrender of claim scope is
evident.
135. Festo, 234 .3d at 632 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
136. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33.




A. Additional Factors for Evaluating Equivalents:
The Formstein Test
A practical way to achieve an acceptable level of predictability re-
garding the scope of the range of equivalents is to revisit and improve
the legal analysis of equivalents already in existence in patent law. Such
a doctrine, utilizing an improved equivalents analysis, brings to the fore-
ground the underlying principles behind the patent laws. The better
solution lies in defining the doctrine of equivalents and not in making
per se rules regarding prosecution history estoppel. Additional factors for
evaluating equivalents should actively supplement the doctrine of
equivalents inquiry to ensure patentees cannot expand patent scope be-
yond what is in the prior art. These additional factors are:
1. If an allegedly infringing device or process forms part of the
prior art, there can be no infringement; and
2. If an allegedly infringing device or process would have been
obvious over the prior art, there can be no infringement; and
3. The aforementioned tests may only encompass those ele-
ments of the allegedly infringing device that are covered in
the patent claim or are an equivalent to an element of the
patent claim.'
These factors can be easily extracted from Supreme Court prece-
dent."'39 In all but a few cases, the alleged infringer was actually
practicing the prior art and thus could not be infringing on the patentee's
patent. The most significant concern should be that "a patentee should
not be able to obtain, under the doctrine of equivalents, coverage which
he [or she] could not lawfully have obtained from the PTO by literal
claims."'" In Festo, the court claims the Supreme Court has never di-
rectly addressed or specifically answered how to determine the scope of
equivalents when prosecution history estoppel applies to a claim ele-
ment. '4 Since the Court did not use the term "prosecution history
estoppel" until its 1997 Warner-Jenkinson decision, this is not surprising.
There are cases from the nineteenth century that the Court acknowledged
138. See supra note 27.
139. See infra note 142.
140. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
141. Festo, 234 F3d at 569.
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in Warner-Jenkinson that set forth the principles of the present doctrine
of prosecution history estoppel .
In cases where the allegedly infringing device approaches the scope
of the prior art, it is important to determine whether the patent owner
should be able to expand patent claims to cover the accused device. A
case hailing from Germany, Formstein, formulates an analysis for this
situation. 43 Formstein presents the test which uses the aforementioned
factors to determine the scope of equivalents. These factors have been
adapted so that they are more compatible with United States legal con-
struction.
PART V
A. Cases Utilizing Additional Factors in Their Rationale
1. Formstein
In Germany, the standard test used for determining the scope of doc-
trine of equivalents infringement is Formstein. The Formstein standard is
applied whenever there is no literal infringement and the defendant pre-
sents prior art coming close to the allegedly infringing device. Formstein
identifies the key policy concerns surrounding expansion of the scope of
patent claims through equivalents, and recites a test to take these con-
cerns into account when determining the scope of protection.
142. Id. at 602 (Michel, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("[A]lithough these
older cases do not specifically recite either of the synonymous phrases "prosecution history
estoppel" or "file wrapper estoppel," the principles articulated in these cases form the core of
the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel that we have applied until today. The phrase "file
wrapper estoppel" was not employed by the Supreme Court until its decision in Exhibit Sup-
ply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 128... (1942), and the Supreme Court did not use
the phrase "prosecution history estoppel" until Warner-Jenkinson .... ). However, many of the
old cases cited in Festo may be inapposite when it comes to modem doctrine of equivalents
analysis. This is because claim style in the nineteenth century significantly differs from that of
modem claim drafting. For example, in some of the old cases, it was possible to claim equiva-
lents in the claim so that any alleged infringement that was an equivalent to a claim element
would actually be a literal infringement. See Hurlbut v. Schillinger, 130 U.S. 456, 463 (1889)
(patent holder claimed a patent in "[tihe arrangement of tar paper or its equivalent between
adjoining blocks of concrete, substantially as and for the purpose set forth?") (first emphasis
added); Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U.S. 222, 223 (1880) (A reissue patent
claimed in "[t]he plate of hard rubber or vulcanite, or its equivalent, for holding artificial teeth
.. .") (emphasis added). Other nineteenth century cases cited in Festo have omnibus claims.
See Hubbell v. United States, 179 U.S. 77, 81-82 (1900); Royer v. Coupe, 146 U.S. 524, 526-
27 (1892); Crawford v. Heysinger, 123 U.S. 589, 596-99 (1887); Sutter v. Robinson, 119 U.S.
530, 535 (1886).
143. BGHZ 98, 12 (F.R.G.) translated in Formstein, 1991 R.P.D.T.M.C. 597, (1991).
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In Formstein, the plaintiff received German Patent No. 2944622,
filed on November 5, 1979, on a molded curbstone '4 These curbstones
were molded to have longitudinal trough and cross-sectional drainage
channels running away from the center of the road.1 4 ' The state of the art
molded curbstones (e.g. the prior art) caused all the rainwater on the road
to be drained off, overburdening the drainage system. 146 Patentee's
molded-curbstones provided for "safe and reliable" drainage.47
Defendant town built a road with sufficient drainage.4 8 Instead of us-
ing molded curbstones, however, defendant used conventional,
commercially available, rounded curbstones running alongside the road
surface. 49 The six-centimeter high curbstones, placed with three-
centimeter gaps between them, provided drainage of run-off water. Be-
lieving this to be a patent infringement, the plaintiff sued defendant and
requested an injunction.5 °
As a defense to infringement, the Court said a defendant could assert
that the alleged infringing stones, were "derived from the prior art in a
manner obvious to a person skilled in the art...." Such a defense is oth-
erwise known as the Formstein defense. 5' Thereafter, the Court
remanded to the Court of Appeals for determination of whether the "al-
leged infringement formed part of the prior art or that in view of that
prior art there was no patentable invention ..... 12 In other words, the
Court required the Court of Appeals to consider whether arranging the
individual stones in the prior art was obvious in view of the prior art. If
arranging the stones in such a manner would have been obvious, then
144. BGHZ 98 at 12 translated in Formstein, 1991 R.P.D.T.M.C. at 600. ("Claims 1 and
2 of the patent read as follows:
An integral or cross-sectionally multi-part molded curbstone with a longitudinal
trough for drainage channels at a roadside, characterized in that it comprises at least
one cross-channel branching off from the longitudinal trough and opening into the
side of the curbstone facing away from the centre of the road.
A molded curbstone as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that the cross-channel
has a slight inclination.
145. Id.
146. BGHZ 98 at 15 translated in Formstein, 1991 R.P.D.T.M.C. at 602.
147. BGHZ 98 at 15 translated in Formstein, 1991 R.P.D.T.M.C. at 602.
148. BGHZ 98 at 13 translated in Formstein, 1991 R.P.D.T.M.C. at 601.
149. Id.
150. BGHZ 98 at 14 translated in Formstein, 1991 R.P.D.T.M.C. at 602.
151. BGHZ 98 at 22 translated in Formstein, 1991 R.P.D.T.M.C. at 606.
152. BGHZ 98 at 22 translated in Formstein, 1991 R.P.D.T.M.C. at 606. In Germany,
only the Patent Court has jurisdiction to nullify or invalidate a patent. See Bekanntmachung
der Neufassung des Patentgesetz (Patentgesetz), v. 16.12.1980 (BGBI.I S.1) translated in IV
Industrial Property Laws and Treaties, (World Intellectual Prop. Org.) Germany, Patent Law, at
2-002 pg. 18 (April 1999) ("An action shall be filed with the Patent Court in writing."). The
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals are not at liberty to nullify or invalidate a patent.
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there was no infringement."3 On the other hand, if the Court of Appeals
found that despite the prior art, inventive activity'" was necessary to dis-
cover the alleged infringement, infringement was possible only if one
skilled in the art found the accused devices to be an equivalent."'
The German courts are not the only courts in Europe to apply the
principles of Formstein. The English House of Lords applied principles
similar to those of Formstein in an early case called, Merrell Dow Phar-
maceuticals Inc. and Another v. H.N. Norton & Co. Ltd. and Others,'6
finding the patent invalid because it was not new.
B. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Another v. H.N.
Norton & Co. Ltd. and Others
57
Merrell Dow was an appeal to the House of Lords by plaintiff-
patentee, Merrell Dow, from a Court of Appeals judgment that dismissed
the patent as invalid. Plaintiffs first obtained a patent on the antihista-
mine, "Terfenadine" used by people suffering from allergies. Plaintiffs
stated that after they filed the patent on "Terfenadine," they discovered,
through research, that 99.5% of it was metabolized in the liver.' This
explained why "Terfenadine" had no side effects, such as drowsiness.' 9
Through further analysis plaintiffs discovered an active acid metabolite
formed in the liver, MDL 16,455. Because the acid metabolite had not
been identified earlier, plaintiffs patented this substance. 6"
When the patent on "Terfenadine" expired, competitors began manu-
facturing a generic substance equivalent to "Terfenadine?' Plaintiffs sued
153. BGHZ 98 at 22-23 translated in Formstein, 1991 R.P.D.T.M.C. at 606.
154. Instead of engaging in a nonobviousness-inquiry, like the United States, European
patent practice requires the patent applicant to show inventive step.
155. BGHZ 98 at 23 translated in Formstein, 1991 R.PD.T.M.C. at 607.
156. 1996 R.P.D.T.M.C. 76, (1995) (H.L.). The House of Lords is the final court of ap-
peal on points of law in civil cases for the United Kingdom and the final court of appeal in
criminal cases for England, wales and Northern Ireland. See also Gillette Safety Razor Co. v.
Anglo-American Trading Co., 1913 R.P.D.T.M.C. 465, 480-81 (1913) (H.L.) (Moulton, L.,
concurring) ("It is impossible for an ordinary member of the public to keep watch on all the
numerous Patents which are taken out and to ascertain the validity and scope of their claims.
But he is entitled to feel secure if he knows that that which he is doing differs from that which
has been done of old only in non-patentable variations, such as the substitution of mechanical
equivalents or changes of material shape or size. The defence that "the alleged infringement
was not novel at the date of the plaintiff's Letters Patent" is a good defence in law, and it
would sometimes obviate the great length and expense of Patent cases if the defendant could
and would put forth his case in this form, and thus spare himself the trouble of demonstrating
on which horn of the well-known dilemma the plaintiff had impaled himself, invalidity or non-
infringement.").
157. 1996 R.P.D.T.M.C. 76, (1995) (H.L.).





defendants for patent infringement on the later filed application covering
the acid metabolite, MDL 16,455. Interestingly, the defendants' allegedly
infringing substance did not contain MDL 16,455.16 The patient's liver
was actually responsible for processing the acid metabolite..'6 2 The key
issue in the case was whether the subsequent discovery about the way
"Terfenadine" was broken down in the body had the effect of removing
the process, or any part of it, from the public domain. 63
In evaluating the merits of plaintiffs' case, the House of Lords ap-
plied the principles of Formstein, finding the patent invalid. Lord
Hoffman, writing for the Court said:
It is the invention which must be new and which must therefore
not be part of the state of the art.['6] It is therefore part of the
state of the art if the information which has been disclosed en-
ables the public to know the product under a description
sufficient to work the invention.'6
Lord Hoffman further explained the importantance that patents not
obtain coverage extending into the state of the art.'6




164. The term "state of the art" is comparable to the term "prior art" in U.S. patent law.
See Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), October 5,
1973 art. 54, 13 I.L.M. 270,286.
165. Merrell Dow, 1996 R.ED.T.M.C. at 89.
166. Imagine a scientist telling an Amazonian Indian about the discoveries of 1820 and
1944. He says: "We have found that the reason why the bark is good for fevers is that it con-
tains an alkaloid with a rather complicated chemical structure which reacts with the red
corpuscles in the bloodstream. It is called quinine" The Indian replies: "That is very interest-
ing. In my tribe, we call it the magic spirit of the bark ' Does the Indian know about quinine?
My Lords, under the description of a quality of the bark which makes it useful for treating
fevers, he obviously does. I do not think it matters that he chooses to label it in animistic
rather than chemical terms. He knows that the bark has a quality which makes it good for
fever and that is one description of quinine.
On the other hand, in a different context, the Amazonian Indian would not know about
quinine. If shown pills of quinine sulphate, he would not associate them with the cinchona
bark. He does not know quinine under the description of a substance in the form of pills. And
he certainly would not know about the artificially synthesised alkaloid.
I recognise that there is a distinction between cinchona bark and terfenadine. The former
is a substance occurring in nature and the latter is an artificial product. This might have been
relevant if the medicinal qualities of the bark had been unknown and a person who discovered
them had tried to patent the bark or the natural alkaloid. But the distinction is not material to
the present question, which is essentially an epistemological one: what does it mean to know
something, so that it can be part of the state of the art? The quinine example shows that there
are descriptions under which something may in a relevant sense be known without anyone
being aware of its chemical composition or even that it has an identifiable molecular structure.
This proposition is unaffected by whether the substance is natural or artificial. Id. at 88.
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The Federal Circuit has not directly applied the Formstein test. A
similar analysis to Formstein nevertheless appeared in Wilson Sporting
Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates."7
C. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates
In Wilson Sporting Goods, the defendant appealed from the district
court's findings of patent infringement and patent validity. Plaintiff pat-
ented a configuration of dimples on a golf ball cover that increased ball
flight. Plaintiff sued defendant for patent infringement. Because defen-
dant's golf balls did not fall literally within the claims, plaintiff argued
defendant infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.
The court held that even if the function-way-result ("F-W-R") test is
satisfied, "there can be no infringement if the asserted scope of equiva-
lency of what is literally claimed would encompass the prior art."' 6" This
is so because "patentee should not be able to obtain, under the doctrine
of equivalents, coverage which he [or she] could not lawfully obtain
from the PTO by literal claims. 169 Thus, "prior art always limits what an
inventor could have claimed, it limits the range of permissible equiva-
lents of a claim.,
170
To determine whether defendants' products fell within the permitted
range of equivalents, the court applied a "hypothetical patent claim"
analysis to decide whether infringement occurred. This analysis encom-
passed visualizing a "hypothetical patent claim," whereby such claim
was written with sufficient scope to literally encompass the accused
product. 7' If the PTO could have allowed the hypothetical claim over the
prior art, then the prior art was not a bar to infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents. 72 If, however, the converse was true and the PTO
could not have allowed the hypothetical claim over the prior art, allow-
ing patentee to extend patent coverage to ensnare the prior art would be
improper.173 The court employed the hypothetical claim analysis in order
to provide a more precise way to determine infringement. Hypothetical
claim analysis served as an alternative to simply looking to see if the
accused product would have been obvious in view of the prior art.
Here, the court found that a hypothetical claim drawn to the literal
scope of the accused product would have been obvious over the prior art.
Thus, the plaintiff's patent could not be given a range of equivalents
167. 904 E2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
168. Id. at 683.







broad enough to encompass the defendant's accused golf balls.'74 Al-
though the court did not actively apply the Formstein test, the test's
underlying principles were followed. The court answered the question:
How far should equivalents extend and why should the prior art be a
limitation on the permissible range of equivalents? If we compare this to
the Formstein test, we see it is similar. This means the patentee should
not be able to obtain coverage over something that is not new or nonob-
vious over the prior art. The Federal Circuit left unanswered, the
question of what conditions and limitations should be placed on parties
drawing a hypothetical claims. The hypothetical claim analysis would be
more effective if limits were placed on how parties drafted hypothetical
claim language. As suggested in the final additional factor of the modi-
fied Formstein test, the hypothetical claim should only encompass those
elements of the allegedly infringing device that are covered in the patent
claim or are an equivalent to an element of the patent claim. The Federal
Circuit may not have fully embraced the hypothetical claim analysis it
created in Wilson Sporting Good's because it lacked restrictions similar
to those found in the last factor of the modified Formstein test.
D. Improving the Hypothetical Claim Analysis
of Wilson Sporting Goods
The Wilson Sporting Goods "hypothetical claim" analysis has re-
ceived a warm reception when applied to ensure that the doctrine of
equivalents does not ensnare prior art. 75 This analysis, however, can be
somewhat difficult to use. Drafting a proper "hypothetical" claim is both
complicated and tricky, because Wilson did not set forth specific limita-
tions as to what can be amended in the original claim for inclusion in the
hypothetical claim. To improve the hypothetical claim analysis, only the
limitations, which are not literally met by the alleged infringement,
should be amended. For example, if a patent claim includes elements a,
b, and c, and the alleged infringement includes a, b, and c', where c' is
close to c, the hypothetical claim may not set limitations on, or amend,
language regarding a and b, because claim elements a and b literally read
on the accused device. Put another way, the patent claim is a, b, and c;
while the alleged infringement is a, b, and c'; then the hypothetical claim
may not amend original claim language covering a and b. Amending
original claim language that literally reads on the alleged infringement
174. Id. at 685.
175. Marquip, Inc. v. FosberAm., Inc., 198 F3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Based on
the fundamental principle that no one deserves an exclusive right to technology already in the
public domain, this court has consistently limited the doctrine of equivalents to prevent its
application to ensnare prior art').
Festo
30 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
can lead to drafting a hypothetical claim that covers the accused device,
but avoids prior art. 176
In Streamfeeder, LLC v. Sure-Feed Systems, Inc.,' 77 for example, the
Federal Circuit criticized the defendant's "hypothetical claim" saying
such "analysis is not an opportunity to freely redraft granted claims."'76
In that case, Streamfeeder owned U.S. Patent No. 4,991,831 (the '831
patent) drawn to a bottom sheet feeder apparatus that collated paper for
processing in industrial applications, including mailings, printing and
binding.1 79 Sure-Feed sold the commercial embodiment of U.S. Patent
No. 5,601,282, an allegedly infringing device. Streamfeeder sued Sure-
feed for infringement of claim 1 of the '831 patent.
Both devices fed stacks of paper forward through a machine from
the bottom. A gate prevented more than one sheet, taking the bottom-
most sheet first, from traveling through the machine. The dispute be-
tween the parties centered on the gate element. The gate element
disclosed in the specification differed from the gate element claimed.
Unlike the gate in the patent claim, the gate element in the specification
176. See Streamfeeder, LLC v. Sure-Feed Sys., Inc., 175 F3d 974, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(stating that a hypothetical claim may permit extending the claim to cover subject matter
equivalent to that which is literally claimed but warning that such claim should not be written
to encompass the accused device but be narrowed to avoid prior art).
177. 175 F.3d 974 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
178. Id. at 983.
179. Id. at 975.
180. Claim 1 of the '831 patent reads as follows:
An apparatus for serially feeding sheets in a forward direction from the bottom of a
generally vertical stack of such sheets comprising:
means for supporting the generally vertical stack of sheets and so that the
stack defines a forward side composed of aligned forward edges of the sheets,
and a bottom, said supporting means including endless belt means and means
rotatably mounting said endless belt means so as to have an upper run posi-
tioned to extend across the bottom of said stack;
drive means for rotating said endless belt so that said upper run moves in the
forward direction; and
means including a stationary gate forming member positioned above said up-
per run of said belt means and adjacent the forward side of said stack and so as
to define a nip which forms a gap between said gate forming member and said
upper run, for permitting the lowermost sheet of the stack to pass forwardly
from the stack through said nip, said gate forming member including first sur-
face means facing toward forward side of said stack so as to engage the
forward edges of the sheets in the stack, and second surface means at said nip
and having a coefficient of friction which is higher than that of said first sur-
face means, and such that the lowermost sheet is free to pass through said nip
without significant frictional resistance while the sheet immediately above the
lowermost sheet is retarded in moving through said gap by its frictional en-




was characterized as circular.'8' The gate element in the accused device
was elliptical. Streamfeeder, in its hypothetical claim, redrafted the
original claim to narrow the gate element and replace it with the limita-
tions of the gate element disclosed in the specification. Streamfeeder
amended the gate element in the hypothetical claim as follows (amended
language in italics):
ORIGINAL CLAIM HYPOTHETICAL CLAIM
said gate forming member including first said gate forming member comprising a
surface means facing toward forward side cylindrical member having a plurality of
of said stack so as to engage the forward annular grooves formed inwardly from a
edges of the sheets in the stack... periphery thereof at regularly spaced intervals
and with elastomeric bands disposed in said
annular grooves and including first surface
means facing toward forward side of said
stack so as to engage the forward edges of
the sheets in the stack...
In drafting this hypothetical claim, the patentee narrowed the gate
limitation to "consist specifically of a cylindrical member containing
elastomeric bands ....1 The gate element should not have been
amended, because the allegedly infringing device literally infringed this
element. Further, the original claim actually ensnared the prior art. Thus,
the court found that patentee's hypothetical claim, without the narrowed
limitation, read on the prior art. 13
In a properly drafted hypothetical claim, each element of the claim
which is not literally infringed should correspond to each element of the
alleged infringement. For example, if the original Claim is a, b, and c;
while the alleged infringement is a, b, and c'; then the hypothetical claim
should only amend the original claim as to c'. The entire hypothetical
claim should be drafted to cover a, b, and c' only. This means that the
exchange element, c', must be the element that fulfills the doctrine of
equivalents test (e.g. function-way-result or the insubstantial change
test), but does not add anything new. Put another way, if the patent claim
is a, b, and c; while the alleged infringement is a, b, c', and d; then the
hypothetical claim should not include d, because d is an entirely new
element.
181. ld. at 976-79.
182. Id. at 982.
183. Id. at 983-84.
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In Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co.,'" the court lambasted
the patentee for using a hypothetical claim analysis that operated "to the
exclusion of the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel or the All [Ele-
ments] Rule."' 85 Obviously, the court found that the patentee's "poorly-
articulated hypothetical claim analysis" failed.
1 6
Wilson Sporting Goods nevertheless provides a good basis for apply-
ing the principles of Formstein to circumscribe the scope of equivalents
in tandem with an inquiry into pertinent and substantive public policy
issues. Hypothetical claim analysis, however, should place specific limits
on parties as to how they draft the hypothetical claim. First, parties
should not be permitted to include elements that are literally infringed by
the accused device. Second, the hypothetical claim should only encom-
pass those elements of the alleged infringing device that correspond to
elements in the patent claim or are the equivalent of an element of the
patent claim, as suggested in the final additional factor of the modified
Formstein test.
PART VI
A. Tangential Issues Related to Festo
It is important to look at how practitioners may react to the "com-
plete bar" rule of Festo. Since the "complete bar" only applies to
amended claims, practitioners will probably avoid making amendments.
One of the best ways to accomplish this is, of course, by narrowing the
claim. Making claims narrower initially lessens the chance of prior art
rejections. Practitioners, however, will want to preserve the ability to
argue broader equivalents in subsequent litigation. They can accomplish
this by disclosing broader subject matter in the specification and not
claiming it. They can then point to the specification and argue that
equivalents reach as far as what they have disclosed.
This may not be a viable option as there are two conflicting Federal
Circuit cases addressing whether subject matter disclosed in the patent
specification, but not claimed, falls within the scope of equivalents. The
two conflicting cases are Maxvell v. Baker, Inc.8 7 and YBM Magnex, Inc.
v. International Trade Commission88
In Maxwell, the Federal Circuit held that failure to claim subject
matter disclosed in the patent specification dedicates the disclosed matter
184. 229 F.3d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
185. Id. at 1107.
186. Id. at 1107.
187. 86 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
188. 145 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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to the public.' 9 The Federal Circuit distinguished YBM Magnex from
Maxwell, on its facts and held that Supreme Court guidance "does not
permit the blanket rule that everything disclosed but not claimed is
barred from access to the doctrine of equivalence... ,,t90
B. Maxwell v. Baker, Inc.191
When distributing shoes, matching shoes must be kept paired to-
gether. Some manufacturers connect shoes with plastic filaments through
shoe eyelets, but not all shoes have eyelets. As a result, some manufac-
turers make holes in eyelet-less shoes to keep them together. This often
damages the shoes. Maxwell, an employee at Targete, invented and pat-
ented a system for fastening mated pairs of shoes through securing tabs
inside the shoe so they could be fastened together without damage."" Her
system required the fastening tab to be placed between the inner and
outer soles, separate from the inside shoe lining. Defendant Baker pur-
chased shoes from manufacturers and instructed them to connect the
shoes using a "fabric loop" inserted under a shoe's sock lining, but not
between the inner and outer soles. Maxwell sued Baker for patent in-
fringement.
In its analysis, the court found that because Baker did not secure fas-
tening tabs between the inner and outer soles, but rather, under the sock
lining, there could be no infringement. Apparently, Maxwell's specifica-
tion disclosed an alternative fastening system whereby "the fastening
tab .... may be 'stitched into a lining seam of the shoes at the sides or
back of the shoes."'19" The court held that "[b]y failing to claim these
alternatives, the Patent and Trademark Office was deprived of the oppor-
tunity to consider whether these alternatives were patentable [by
Maxwell]."' 94 The Federal Circuit was very concerned about whether the
disclosed matter had been dedicated to the public:
A person of ordinary skill in the shoe industry, reading the speci-
fication and prosecution history, and interpreting the claims,
would conclude that Maxwell, by failing to claim the alternate
shoe attachment systems in which the tabs were attached to the
inside shoe lining, dedicated the use of such systems to the pub-
lic. As a matter of law, J. Baker could not infringe by using an
189. Maxvell, 86 E3d at 1106-08.
190. YBMMagnex, 145 F.3d at 1320.
191. 86 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
192. Maxnvell, 86 .3d at 1101-02. See U.S. Patent No. 4,624,060 (issued Nov. 25,
1986).
193. Id. at 1106 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,624,060 (issued Nov. 25, 1986)).
194. Id. at 1108 (footnote omitted).
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alternate shoe attachment system that Maxwell dedicated to the
public.9
Among other things, the court reversed the trial court's decision de-
nying Baker's motion for judgment as a matter of law that its under-the-
sock-lining fasteners did not infringe.'96
C. YBMMagnex, Inc. v. International Trade Commission 1
9 7
Patentee brought an action to enforce a consent order, wherein re-
spondents agreed not to import allegedly infringing magnets. The
consent order was issued pursuant to Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, 19 U.S.C. 1337, (1995). The International Trade Commission
(ITC) modified the consent order and found the importation was not
barred. The Federal Circuit reversed the decision as an error of law.
YBM owns U.S. Patent No. 4,588,439 (issued May 13, 1986), drawn
to a magnet alloy having at least one rare earth element, iron and speci-
fied amounts of oxygen. Adjusting the oxygen content improved the
magnet's stability in warm, humid conditions. In claim 1, the oxygen
level was listed as 6,000 to 35,000 ppm oxygen. During the administra-
tive law judge's (AL's) investigation, the allegedly infringing magnets
were measured as having an oxygen content between 5,450 ppm and
6,000 ppm, ±150 ppm.98 The ALJ held the magnets infringed either lit-
erally or under the doctrine of equivalents.
YBM filed an enforcement complaint against three respondents, al-
leging their continued importation of infringing products. While the
enforcement proceeding was pending, Maxwell was decided. The ALJ
nevertheless held that Maxwell did not foreclose applying the doctrine of
equivalents to encompass oxygen contents of 5,450 to 6,000 ppm. The
ITC reversed the ALJ, finding that "Maxwell established a new rule of
law, and that the doctrine of equivalents can no longer be applied to
reach subject matter that is disclosed in the patent but not claimed"' 9
Thus, the Commission held that oxygen contents below 6,000 ppm could
not infringe as equivalents. YBM appealed the ITC's decision.
The court distinguished this case from Maxwell, stating that Max-
well had "disclosed two distinct alternative ways in which pairs of shoes
195. Id.
196. Id; Cf. Maxmvell, 86 E3d at 1106 (Baker had purchased some shoes that infringed
because the shoes were fastened between the inner and outer soles).
197. 145 F3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
198. Id. at 1319.
199. Id. at 1320.
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are attached for sale, and claimed only one of them' 2 Because the dis-
tinct and separate alternative was not included in the patent claims,
Maxwell was able to avoid examination of that method. There was no
way to know if Maxwell could have received a patent on the unclaimed
method. The ITC was incorrect in assuming that, after Maxwell, it was
"irrelevant whether there is probative evidence of insubstantial differ-
ences... [or equivalents]" 2 The court later went on to state:
The doctrine of equivalents seeks to establish a just balance be-
tween the purpose of claims to define and give notice of what is
patented, and the judicial responsibility to avoid a "fraud on the
patent" based on insubstantial changes from the patented inven-
tion. The fundamentals of the law of equivalency implement
these premises, and were not changed by Maxwell as applied to
all situations. Maxwell did not displace the wealth of precedent
that permits determination of equivalency, vel non, as to subject
matter included in the written description but not claimed.
202
To resolve the disagreement between Maxwell and YBM Magnex, the
Federal Circuit has ordered an en banc review of Johnson & Johnston
Associates, Inc. v. R.E. Service Co.203 to address the pertinent issues. In
its Order, the court directed supplemental briefings and oral arguments
be confined to the following questions:
1. Whether and under what circumstances a patentee can rely
upon the doctrine of equivalents with respect to unclaimed
subject matter disclosed in the specification.
2. Whether in this case the jury's finding of infringement
should be reversed because the patentee was foreclosed from
asserting the doctrine of equivalents with respect to un-
claimed subject matter disclosed in the specification.0
From these questions, it is evident the court intends to clarify
whether subject matter disclosed in the specification, but not claimed,
should be within reach of equivalents. In any case, the outcome of John-
son & Johnston Associates will have a significant impact on how
practitioners write patent applications.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1322.
203. 238 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (en bane).
204. Id.
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PART VII
CONCLUSION
In the United States, doctrine of equivalents jurisprudence histori-
cally converged with the jurisprudence of Germany and the United
Kingdom. Both Germany and the United Kingdom, like the United
States, are heavily industrialized nations. The common jurisprudence
incorporated the underlying principles of granting adequate protection to
patent owners while preserving the public's ownership over the public
domain. The recent Federal Circuit decision in Festo will potentially
yield disparate treatment for patent applications having identical claims,
which would cause inadequate patent protection. Festo favors per se
bright line rules over consistency and substance, while embellishing
subordinate patent law issues (e.g. prosecution history estoppel).
Festo has effectively eliminated doctrine of equivalents infringement
in commonplace infringement cases. Where a narrowing amendment to a
claim element is made during prosecution for a reason substantially re-
lated to patentability, no range of equivalents is available as to that
element.25 It does not matter what was substantively said or whether the
applicant was silent as to why the amendment was made.2O, Applying a
doctrine of equivalents analysis is completely barred under the doctrine
of prosecution history estoppel.
The Federal Circuit adopted a bright line rule because the court felt
the current practice was "unworkable." Rather than making bright line
rules, the court should revisit and improve the legal analysis of equiva-
lents already in existence and implement a workable doctrine. A doctrine
utilizing an improved equivalents analysis brings to the foreground the
underlying principles behind the patent laws. The better solution lies in
defining the doctrine of equivalents and not in creating per se rules re-
garding prosecution history estoppel. Additional factors should actively
supplement the doctrine of equivalents inquiry to ensure patentees can-
not expand patent scope beyond what is in the prior art. After such a
determination is made, the obviousness inquiry should be employed to
determine whether or not there is an infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. The additional factors useful to this inquiry are:
1. If an allegedly infringing device or process forms part of the
prior art, there can be no infringement; and
2. If an allegedly infringing device or process would have been
obvious over the prior art, there can be no infringement; and
205. Festo, 234 F.3d at 574-78.
206. Id. at 577-78.
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3. The aforementioned tests may only encompass those ele-
ments of the allegedly infringing device that are covered in
the patent claim or are an equivalent to an element of the
patent claim.
Further, prosecution history estoppel should be used as a true estoppel
doctrine and only limit patent scope where applicant affirmatively sur-
renders claim scope.""
207. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 619-20 (Rader, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Festo
